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Remarks of Deborah Goldberg
Deborah Goldberg
The question of "Financial Modernization: What's in it for
Communities?" can be approached in at least two ways. One is to
consider the "financial modernization" bill, passed by Congress last
November and signed into law by the President shortly thereafter, and
its effect on the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). A second
approach is to look at the trends underway in the financial services
industry and the changes that industry spokespeople view as creating a
more modem financial services system in this country; then, analyze
how those changes are affecting low and moderate income
communities.
To the extent that we are talking about the Gramm-LeachBliley Financial Services Modernization Act, and in the context of the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), the answer for the
communities has to be, "Not much," or at least, not much that's good.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLBA)' is a law that is the culmination
of a twenty-year effort in Congress. The Act not only addresses the
major priorities of most sectors of the financial services industry, but
was also largely written by the industry. GLBA dismantles a structure
that has been in place since the Great Depression. It is, by any
measure, one of the most important pieces of legislation in the 2 0 th
Century affecting the financial services industry.
Yet, during the debate over this bill, there was virtually no
discussion of how such a major public policy vehicle could, should, or
would be used to further the public interest. There were token
assurances that the public would have "better, cheaper, and faster"
access to financial services, but little real effort to make sure that this
was true.
Therefore, although CRA figured large during the
deliberations, and generated much heat and publicity; it should come
as no surprise that the attention did not translate into legislative
1 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 6801 et seq.) [hereinafter
GLBA]. The GBLA was intended to "enhance competition in the financial services
industry by providing a prudential framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms,
insurance companies, and other financial services providers." See H.R. CONF. REP. No.
106-434 (1999).
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provisions designed to insure "better, cheaper, faster" access to
financial services in this "modernized" world tolow income people
and communities..
What did we get in this bill? We got a modest provision
designed to insure that bank holding companies, and now financial

holding companies, cannot completely abandon service to low income
people and communities in their quest for new financial services
horizons. This is the provision that sets, as a standard for eligibility to
become a financial holding company, the requirement that existing
depository institutions, owned by the holding company, must have
satisfactory or better CRA ratings at the time the parent elects FHC
status, or at the time it commences any new business activities

authorized by the bill2 . This is a useful statement of public policy, and
will surely have some impact. However, the impact should not be
overplayed: since approximately 98% of banks and thrifts now receive
satisfactory or better ratings, this provision is not likely to result in
noticeable differences in local communities. The provision also falls

short of what Chairman Leach 3 would have us believe is the
application of CRA to the insurance and securities branches of the
financial services industry. These industry segments will not come
under any community reinvestment obligations, nor does the bill
provide any handles for community groups to address the insurance

and securities activities of the new financial holding companies.
2 See GBLA tit. 1, §§ 103(a) (amending Sec. 4 of the Bank Holding Company

Act of 1956 by adding a new subsection (1)(2)), 103(b) (amending Sec. 804 of the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977). Through the rulemaking process, the Federal
Reserve Board has diluted the prohibition against financial holding companies
commencing new activities if one of their banking subsidiaries has a less-than-satisfactory
CRA rating. In the preamble to the revised version of Regulation Y (12 C.F.R. pt. 224;
Doc. Nos. R-1057, R-1062, released December 12, 2000), the Federal Reserve Board
stated its belief that, "...
this language [in GLBA] is best read to apply only when an
insured depository institution receives a less-than-satisfactory CRA rating while it is
under the control of the FHC." (See Preamble Regulation Y at 14). Thus, when
Citigroup recently acquired the Associates, which owned a bank with a "Needs to
Improve" CRA rating, the FED held that, because Associates National Bank received that
rating prior to its acquisition by Citigroup, its status with respect to CRA would not bar
Citigroup from launching any new financial activities.
3 Rep. Jim Leach (R-IA), Chairman of the House Banking Committee and
chairman of the joint House-Senate conference committee on S. 900.
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Other provisions of the bill look worse. GLBA changes the
CRA exam cycle for small banks - those with assets under $250
million - to five years for banks with outstanding CRA ratings and
four years for banks with satisfactory ratings 4. These changes are
unlikely to yield any tangible benefits for banks, who will still have
other exams (safety and soundness and other consumer compliance
exams) on shorter cycles, and whose CRA exams will simply cover
longer time periods. Yet, by lengthening the time between CRA
exams, these changes may have a detrimental impact on the public,
particularly in rural communities where small banks play a more
significant role than in many urban areas.
The so-called "CRA Sunshine" language in GLBA is another
problematic provision 5. This is the section that requires parties to
"CRA agreements" to disclose the text of the agreement, report
annually on funds paid and received, and activities conducted under
the agreement, and subject them to various penalties for failure to
comply with these requirements. The federal banking regulators have
yet to finalize regulations to implement this provision, so the details
remain to be seen.6 Nonetheless, the "Sunshine" provision is likely to
have a chilling effect on CRA activity. It will discourage community
groups from participating in the regulatory process, which has been
fundamental to CRA's success over the years. Furthermore, it will
undoubtedly discourage the partnerships that have grown up between
banks and community groups, which have been the vehicle through
which CRA's benefits have been realized in local communities all
across the country.
This chilling effect appears to be just what the key sponsors of
the provision intended; 7 and, makes it vital that the regulators take to
4 See GBLA tit VII, § 712 (amending the Community Reinvestment Act to

add a new sec. 809 entitled, "Small Bank Regulatory Relief').
5 See GBLA tit VII, § 711 (amending the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to
add a new Sec. 48).
6 Proposed regulations to implement the CRA Sunshine provisions in GLBA
were issued jointly by the four federal banking regulatory agencies in May, 2000. See
Disclosure and Reporting of CRA-Related Agreements, 65 Fed. Reg. 31961 et. seq.
(proposed rule) (May 19, 2000). The comment period closed on July 21, 2000. As of
mid-October, no final rule had been promulgated.
7 See, e.g., Gramm Urges Thrifts to Refuse Demands for Cash in CRA
Disputes, American Banker, March 8, 2000.
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heart the language in the conference report, crafting regulations that
will minimize the reporting burden for banks, community groups and
others caught in the "Sunshine" web. Unless they do this, and perhaps
even if they're successful in minimizing the reporting burden, this
provision raises serious First Amendment issues. It also undermines
the regulators' ability to carry out their CRA enforcement obligations
effectively, and furthers Senator Gramm's anti-CRA crusade.
Banks were remarkably silent on this issue during the
legislative debate. However, this is an area where their interests and
those of community groups are very similar. Hopefully themutual
interest will be reflected in the comments the industry submits on the
proposed regulations.
The bill also calls for two CRA-related studies. One, assigned
to the Treasury Department, requires that agency to assess the impact
of the legislation on CRA-related activity. 8 The report is due two
years after enactment, although the Department is required to report
baseline information to Congress by May 15, 2000. At this point,
details about this report have not been made public. 9
The second study is assigned to the Federal Reserve Board, 10
to assess defaults and delinquencies in "CRA loans," and evaluate the
profitability of those loans.

The Board collects the necessary

information through a voluntary survey of financial institutions, and
releases a draft of the proposed survey instrument. The draft raises
some grave concerns. For example, it asks a series of questions about
banks' experiences with various loan program and products, and asks
the respondents to indicate whether their answers are based on actual
data or whether they are "educated guesses." Any time a survey form
8 See GBLA tit VII, § 715 (requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to study
"the extent to which adequate services are being provided as intended by the Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977, including services in low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods and for persons of modest means, as a result of the enactment of this
Act.").
9 See Robert E. Litan, Nicolas P. Retsinas, Eric S. Belsky, and Susan White
Haag, The Community Reinvestment Act After Financial Modernization: A Baseline
Report, Treasury Report (issued April 19, 2000). The report focused primarily on
mortgage lending trends in 305 U.S. cities between 1993 and 1998. Id.
'0 See GBLA tit. VII, § 713 ("Federal Reserve Board Study of CRA Lending"). The
Board released its study, "The Performance and Profitability of CRA-Related Lending" in
July, 2000.
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offers respondents the opportunity to guess at their answers, one has
to wonder what the final results will show. However, regardless of
the final results of this study, we can be sure that Senator Gramm will
use them to continue his attack on CRA.
Let's go back to the original question: what does "financial
modernization" offer to communities, specifically low and moderate
income communities and communities of color? Answering this
question requires us to take a look at broader trends in the world of
financial services. These changes were reflected in the GLBA, but
they predated it, and would likely have continued even if the Act was
not passed. How these changes will play out for all of the different
sectors of the financial services world and the communities they
serve, is not yet clear. But, in trying to anticipate the impact that these
changes will have, it may be helpful to think about what they will
mean for the future implementation of CRA, which has been the
primary tool available to communities to insure access to quality,
affordable financial services. A look at the key elements of "financial
modernization" highlights some of the limits of CRA, and the ways in
which it, too, must be modernized.
One of the major trends underway in financial services is
consolidation. For some time now, banks have been getting bigger
and bigger as mergers and acquisitions proliferate. Post-GLBA, we
may see bigger and bigger financial services companies, combining
not just banking but other financial services under one corporate roof.
Even before GLBA, and just within the banking sector, the effects of
consolidation on CRA are striking.
The centerpiece of CRA, in many ways, is the CRA rating,
which is intended to be a reflection of each institution's performance
in helping to meet the credit needs of the community it is chartered to
serve. Each bank and thrift gets a single CRA rating on a four-point
scale ranging from Outstanding to Substantial Non-compliance.
When the law was enacted in 1977, the one-rating-per-bank system
was a reasonable way to provide some indication of bank
performance. At that time, no one envisioned a single institution with
branches from coast to coast, serving thousands of local communities.
Yet, it is impossible for a single CRA rating to effectively capture a
large institution's performance in each of the communities in which it
has a presence. Inevitably, the performance of large institutions will
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vary from place to place. They will be doing a better job in some
places and a comparatively worse job in others. For the largest banks,
the one-rating-per-bank system no longer provides an effective
indication of how good or poor a job the bank is doing under CRA, in
any given community. As a consequence, it is also no longer an
effective way to hold those institutions to a consistently high standard
across all of their markets."
One of the most important outcomes of CRA in the last twenty
or so years has been the relationships that it has fostered between
banks and thrifts, and community groups and public officials in their
local communities. These relationships have led to the development
of innovative programs and products to address particular local needs
and conditions. Yet, by many reports, these relationships have
suffered as a result of bank consolidation. In some ways, this comes
as no surprise. Large institutions are, by their very nature, less
flexible. They tend to centralize decision-making in a few locations.
This provides for consistency, but also means that decision-makers
may not be familiar with important details of the many geographic
markets the bank serves.
Large institutions have a hard time managing many different
programs and relationships, particularly when dispersed over large
geographic areas. Quality control is a great challenge under such
circumstances. For a large institution, it is easier to develop a set of
standardized products that can be offered in every community. In
effect, the community may be asked to mold itself to the bank's

There is some precedent for the federal banking regulators denying a CRAcovered application on the basis of the appicant' egregiously bad performance in a single
community, even though its performance has been rated as satisfactory in its other
communities. For example, see, the Federal Reserve Board's order denying the
application of First Interstate BancSystem of Montana, Inc. to merge with Commerce
BancShares of Wyoming, Inc., October 7, 1991. At the time, First Interstate was the third
largest commercial banking organization in Montana, and Commerce was the fourth
largest in Wyoming. Both were multi-bank holding companies. The denial was based on
the inadequate CRA performance of a single First Interstate Bank in Colstrip, Montana,
which accounted for only a small portion of the overall deposits of the applicant. The
Colstrip bank had received a less than satisfactory CRA rating because it essentially
redlined the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation. However, this standard of holding
an institution accountable for the "weakest link" in its CRA performance has not been
applied widely, either by the Federal Reserve or the other agencies.
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product offerings, rather than the reverse. Large institutions, may
more easily establish relationships with a small number of
intermediary organizations, rather than trying to keep up with local
contacts in many markets, which is a fairly labor intensive
undertaking. Centralization and standardization make efforts easier
for the bank, but undermine the flexibility that has been so important
to the success of CRA. For banks, all of these trends make perfect
sense. Banking regulators are unlikely to challenge them, and indeed,
may support them. But for local community organizations and local
public officials, these effects of consolidation may diminish the
usefulness of CRA as a tool for addressing their particular local credit
needs.
A second trend that is troublesome, from a CRA perspective,
is the increasingly complex corporate structures that characterize
financial services companies. Take the mortgage lending business as
an example. When CRA was enacted in 1977, mortgages were
generally made by banks, savings and loans, or mortgage companies.
For the most part, these were separate institutions with separate
ownership. These days, we have these three types of lenders, along
with finance companies, making mortgage loans, under the same
corporate roof. The result is that affiliates of the same parent
company may be offering similar products in the same communities,
competing with their corporate brothers and sisters. As the law is
currently interpreted, the type of company (insured depository
institution vs. other) determines whether activities are subject to CRA
review, not the type of activity. A loan that would be reviewed under
CRA, if offered by a bank or thrift, escapes scrutiny if offered by that
bank or thrift's mortgage company, finance company, or other
affiliate. The only exception to this rule occurs when the insured
depository opts to rely on the record of an affiliate as part of its own
CRA performance review.
A bank performing a modest level of mortgage business in
low income or minority areas, and its finance company affiliate
marketing very aggressively in those same communities and capturing
a much larger share of the market, is not uncommon. Sometimes, we
see the bank helping people build assets and wealth, while its affiliate
may be stripping wealth away through predatory lending practices.
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Even where this worst case scenario does not exist, the
company may be hard pressed to make sure that the customer ends up
with the best (that is, lowest cost and lowest risk) product for which
he or she qualifies. In fact, it is not at all clear that those in the
business feel any obligation to make sure that the customer ends up
with the best product available from among the various corporate
affiliates - bank, thrift, mortgage company, or finance company. At
the same time, the customer may be hard pressed to distinguish
between the various affiliates, especially when they carry the same
name. He or she may not understand the advantages or disadvantages
of doing business with a bank, compared to a mortgage company, or
compared to a finance company. Instead, that customer may walk
through the door of the corporate affiliate that is most aggressive in
seeking his or her business, may end up with a less advantageous or
even disadvantageous product, and never know the difference. So far,
CRA has not proven to be an effective tool in addressing this
situation.
A third force at work in the world of financial services, and
one that is actually a catalyst for many of the other changes underway,
is technology. In many ways, technology has transformed the way
banks do business. In fact, one could argue that technology is
transforming the kind of business that banks do. It is hard to overstate
the profound impact of technology on financial services.
For low and moderate income people, technology offers the
promise of lower costs and greater access. According to figures from
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, a check deposited with
a teller costs a bank approximately a dollar ($0.95) to process, while a
similar transaction conducted over the Internet costs the bank $0.01.12
One would think that such a dramatic cost reduction would open up
new possibilities for providing affordable banking services to low and
moderate income people.
However, the promise of technology is not a self-fulfilling
one. The technology itself is a barrier for many people, as all of the
12 See Karen Furst, William W. Lang, and Daniel E. Nolle, Technological

Innovation in Banking and Payments: Industry Trends and Implicationsfor Banks , Office

of the Comptroller of the Currency, Quarterly Journal, Vol. 15, No. 3, September 1998, at
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work on the so-called "digital divide" has amply demonstrated. To
take advantage of the savings that might be available by banking over
the Internet, a customer must first have a telephone, a computer and a
modem. He or she must also know how to use them and be
comfortable transacting banking business through this medium.
These barriers may eventually be overcome, but they won't come
down by themselves. It will take a concerted effort by financial
institutions, regulators, community groups and others to make
technology work in a way that lowers cost and increases access to
financial services for low and moderate income people.
There is another, less promising, side to technology as well. It
offers businesses the ability to collect and analyze information about
their customer bases in much more detail than ever before. This
means they can more easily identify those customers who are the most
profitable, and those who are the least profitable. Technology also
affords them ways to distance themselves from - if not actively
discourage - those whose business is less desirable. This is reflected
in the periodic reports of institutions that decide to charge low balance
customers extra fees for talking face-to-face with a teller. Another
example, that comes up periodically in the press, is the institution that
codes customer accounts according to their profitability. When
customers call into the bank's automated phone system, the calls from
those whose accounts are coded as the most profitable are sent to the
front of the queue, while those who are least profitable face seemingly
interminable waits.13 Clearly, technology is a double-edged sword.
In the context of CRA, technology presents a particular
dilemma, because it offers banks ways to deliver services that don't
require customers and banks to be in the same location or even the
same time zone. Information management systems, remote access
devices and the Internet all make it possible for customers to interact
with banks from far away, at virtually any hour of day or night. This
kind of relationship is radically different from the relationship that
existed between banks and their customers in 1977, when CRA
became law. In those days, most transactions between banks and their
customers occurred in a bank branch. Therefore, the branch served as
13 See, e.g., Ken Elkins, More Banks Sorting Customers, American City

Business Journals, Inc., October 13, 1997.
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a reasonable proxy for customer location, and the area around bank
branches provided a reasonable definition of a bank's local
communities. This geographic relationship between bank branches
and bank customers, and indeed a geographic definition of
community, is the building block of CRA, as it was the building block
of the bank charter (since banks are chartered to serve the convenience
and needs of their local communities).
One of the effects of technology is that a bank's community
can no longer be defined in strictly geographic terms, and bank
branches do not necessarily serve as a good proxy for the location of a
Some banks exist primarily in
bank's customers anymore.
cyberspace, and others serve many of their customers in that
medium.' 4 Yet, CRA as it is currently constituted, cannot account for
activity in cyberspace; it flies completely under the "CRA radar." We
need new ways to capture community for purposes of delineating a
bank's obligations under CRA and evaluating its performance in
serving those communities.
A fourth trend underway in the financial services field, that
has implications for low income communities, is the new affiliations
formed between banks and other types of financial services providers.
This is what GLBA was all about: allowing many types of financial
service firms under one corporate roof with very few restrictions.
Perhaps the most well-known of these new combinations is Citigroup,
the $600+ billion behemoth created by the merger of the Citicorp
bank holding company and the Travelers Group insurance
conglomerate. This merger took place even before GLBA became
law, and for some in Congress, Citigroup seemed to be the beacon of
a new era in financial services. In the few years before the "financial
modernization" legislation was enacted, we also saw a raft of
insurance companies and securities firms acquiring thrift institutions;
thereby taking advantage of a somewhat obscure provision of law that
14

In fact, 36% of all Internet banking customers in the U.S. do not have

accounts with Internet-only banks, but rather with Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Bank
One, Citibank or First Union. See Karen Furst, William W. Lang, and Daniel E. Nolle,
Who Offers Internet Banking?, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Quarterly
Journal, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2000, at 45. No statistics are currently available on the
extent to which these customers are located in communities where those banks also have
brick and mortar branches. Id.
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provided them this foothold in the world of banking. In the wake of
GLBA, it seems likely that we will see many other corporate
combinations, although perhaps few that capture the headlines like
Citigroup.
As with technology, these new affiliations offer new ways of
delivering financial services. In addition to, or in place of, the
traditional bank branch, companies will be able to use insurance
agents or stockbrokers to sell banking products. Like technology,
these new channels of service delivery pose challenges for CRA
enforcement.
Take, for example, State Farm, the major insurance company.
State Farm now owns an insured depository institution: State Farm
Financial Services, F.S.B. The bank operates in Illinois, with plans to
expand operations into two other states and ultimately nationwide.
State Farm has 16,000 or so insurance agents all across the country.
These agents will be used as an outlet for selling the bank's products.
Not only will you be able to get car insurance or homeowner's
insurance, or the like from your State Farm agent, but you will also be
able to get credit cards, car loans and leases, home purchase loans,
home equity loans, checking accounts, savings accounts, money
market accounts, CDs, etc. In other words, the company is simply
expanding the range of products its agents can offer to customers
nationwide. In addition, State Farm is also marketing its banking
products directly to its insurance customers through the mail and on
its website.
However, while State Farm and its agents may be selling
banking products nationwide, State Farm Bank will only be evaluated
for CRA purposes in the one community where its only office is
located. Just like Internet banks, activity conducted elsewhere simply
flies under the CRA radar screen; it basically does not count. Thus, in
many - in fact, most - communities where State Farm Bank is
doing business, its performance in helping to meet the credit needs of
low and moderate income people will simply never come under
review.15 The same is true for other insurance companies that own
15 State Farm was one of several insurance companies that made CRA-related
commitments to the Office of the Thrift Supervision (OTS) as part of its application for a
thrift charter. State Farm agreed to make, within three years of launching its operations,
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banks or thrifts and use their insurance agents as substitutes for bank
branches. This is also true for banks or thrifts owned by securities
firms that use their stockbrokers to market their banking products.
Clearly, these new delivery channels create a problem for effective
CRA enforcement.
Another challenge posed by the new affiliations authorized by
GLBA, is how to create a corporate commitment to CRA and a
corporate culture and infrastructure to support community
reinvestment and community development activities. Banks have
learned, (some might say the hard way) over several decades, how to
do this business and what benefits it brings. Insurance companies and
securities firms have not. The question for community groups may be
how to instill in such companies the commitment to serving low and
$195 million in loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers in the three states in which
it planned to initially operate. After the first three years, State Farm agreed to an annual
goal of CRA-related loan commitments and activities equal to the greater of 5% of its
assets or the amount of its deposits generated in low- and moderate-income areas.
OTS conducted its first CRA examination of State Farm Financial Services,
FSB (SFFS) in March, 1999 and released the public portion of the exam report in May,
1999. It gave the institution a "Satisfactory" CRA rating. OTS noted that 79% of SFFS'
lending activity occurred outside of its CRA assessment area, which is defined as the
Bloomington-Normal, Illinois MSA.
OTS examiners analyzed the extent to which the 21% of SFFS loans, service,
and investments made within its assessment area helped to meet the needs of that
community, and found the institution's performance "marginally acceptable."
With respect to the 79% of the SFFS' loans made outside its assessment area,
OTS profiled the income levels of the borrowers (but not the census tracts) and asserted
that SFFS' performance on this measure was "relatively strong" with respect to mortgage
loans, and "good" with respect to consumer loans, although it does not provide the public
with any indication of what benchmarks it used to reach this conclusion. In its analysis of
these consumer loans, the agency noted that, "A factor in this distribution is that
insurance agents are mainly located in middle and upper income census tracts. This limits
SFFS' ability to generate loan volume in the lower income tracts." (See SFFS CRA
Evaluation, at 15 (March 20, 1999)). Nothing in the exam report indicates that OTS
expected SFFS to take any steps to address this imbalance.
OTS did not identify the communities in which any of these outside loans
were made. It did not provide any analysis of the credit needs of those communities or
measure the institution's performance relative to those needs. Nor did it compare SFFS'
performance to any other lenders active in those communities. All of these would have
been part of a traditional CRA analysis.
Further, OTS did not analyze SFFS' performance outside of its assessment
area under the service test. Nor did it even comment on the fact that SFFS did not make
any qualified CRA investments outside of its assessment area.
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moderate income people. The companies also have to learn: how to
develop the local relationships that are fundamental to any
understanding of the credit needs of low income people and
communities; how to develop products to address those needs
effectively; how to build the infrastructure to deliver those products;
and how to insure that those loans and services actually get out on the
street.
Clearly, these dramatic changes underway in the world of
banking and the broader world of financial services pose serious
challenges for low and moderate income communities. CRA remains
the primary public policy tool available to those communities to help
them gain access to the financial mainstream. But, equally clearly,
CRA was not crafted with today's world in mind; it is far from a
perfect fit. CRA was designed to address the issues of its day and
represented the vision of community groups and Congress for a
banking system that served everyone in America.
We now face a new day, in a "modernized" financial services
world. This requires a new vision of how today's world can be
structured to meet the financial services needs of everyone in
America. We face the challenge of putting tools in place that are
appropriate for the task in front of us now. We need a "modernized"
CRA.
Just like the mid-1970's, community groups all across
America are taking on that challenge. Where CRA does not work,
groups will find other avenues to bring about change. At the same
time, they will continue to push Congress to enact the tools needed to
make sure that low income communities are not left in an economic
backwater. And, I am confident that the day will come when a
modernized CRA becomes a reality.

